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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impacts of a differentiated wage system on polyclinics perfor-
mance in Kazakhstan. The government introduced this new system in order to improve health
care provided by polyclinics. I use data for 259 polyclinics for 2014 and based on their effi-
ciency scores, comparing their performance with polyclinics that did not implement the differ-
entiated payment system. The efficiencies of polyclinics are measured by using Data Envel-
opment Analysis (DEA) with bootstrapping method. Inputs in the DEA method are number
of physicians and number of nurses. DEA outputs are number of polyclinic visits and num-
ber of home visits. Using inputs and outputs I estimate efficiency scores for each polyclinic.
After estimating the efficiency score, Tobit regression is used to determine which environ-
mental factors may affect polyclinic performance. The results suggest that on average, wage
differentiation has a negative effect on efficiency scores.
Keywords: polyclinics performance, DEA bootstrapping method, efficiency scores, Tobit
model.
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11 Introduction
Questions related to the development, improvement, and of retaining of human capital resources
are among the most discussed topics in recent years. According to labor economics theory (Bor-
jas, 2012) employees with higher human capital tend to be more productive at work. Therefore,
companies are making alterations in their human capital management using creative, unique, and
unconventional methods to develop fair reward and recognition practices. Such approaches are
considered to be viable tools to motivate employees and to ensure workers’ efficiency, engage-
ment, and integrity (Limaye et al., 2013).
Gerhart et al. (1995) argued that one of the key determinants of the efficient control of human
capital is the employee compensation system. In order to obtain reasonable income and health
security, employees are dependent on wage levels. “For employers, compensation decisions influ-
ence their cost of doing business and thus, their ability to sell at a competitive price in the product
market” (Gerhart et al., 1995). Depending on the company type, structure and organizational unit,
employee pay practices differ on several dimensions (Heneman and Schwab, 1979; Milkovich and
Newman, 1993). In this paper, I discuss the impact of performance-related or differential wage
practices within the context of the health care system of Kazakhstan.
The essence of a differentiated wage system (DWS) of remuneration is the introduction of a
direct, personal, piece-rate wage forms, taking into account the coefficients of complexity of the
work and the results of labor (Altman, 2000). In healthcare, the wages of employees do not only
depend on the qualitative results, but also are determined by the actual amount of time worked.
Hence, it follows that the remuneration system should create an incentive for medical professionals
in the final results of their work, providing a balance between the level of their economic motivation
2and the results of professional activity.
Until 2011, the salaries of health workers did not have a sufficient incentive feature to im-
prove the medical performance of polyclinics in Kazakhstan. To improve the health care system
of the country, in 2011, the Government of Kazakhstan adopted a state program called "Salamatty
Kazakhstan" (Healthy Kazakhstan). One of the mechanisms for the implementation of this pro-
gram was to introduce differentiated payment in the activities of medical institutions and thus to
promote the outcomes of professional activities of health workers. Depending on the magnitude
and the quality of the care provided by medical workers, the program aims to improve the quality
of medical care by increasing the efficiency of the medical staff and the polyclinics (a clinic or a
hospital dealing with various diseases) as a whole. Thus, the salary of medical workers increased
from 50 to 500 US dollars on average, and in January 2014 the Government has spent 98 million
KZT tenge equivalent to 630 thousand US dollars under the differentiated salary system (Health
Care Statistical Yearbook, 2015).
This paper estimates the relative impact of differentiated salary payment in the polyclinics
performance of Kazakhstan by computing their relative efficiency scores. Hence, the aim is to
establish whether polyclinics with a differentiated wage system are more efficient than those that
did not introduce this system. The results show that the differentiated wage system has a negative
and significant effect on the polyclinic efficiency scores.
2 Literature review
The rationale for the differentiated salary system is to motivate individuals to obtain a higher
performance level (Banker et al., 2001, Heneman and Werner, 2005). Consequently, different
3forms of differential wage plans have emerged that vary with performance level and methods of
allocating awards to employees (Park and Sturman, 2009). A number of studies (e.g., Banker
et al., 1996, Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002) have found empirical evidence that performance level
compensation helps to achieve greater efficiency at the individual level and company level.
A study by Park and Sturman (2009) analyze the different effects of compensation the system
that simultaneously affects employees’ productivity, and find that the most important indicator
of salary rewards is the individual performance. They conclude that the performance levels were
closely related to the reward for different performance plans, implying that the pay-for performance
plans are effective(Park and Sturman, 2009).
Another research by Lucifora and Origo (2012) analyze the impacts of switching from fixed
wages to performance related pay on firms’ productivity in Italy. The authors find that the imple-
mentation of new payment schemes resulted in a three to five per cent increase in productivity of
the firms. They also conclude that the efficiency gains may vary significantly depending on the
firm size, type of the industry, and the number of workers.
In their studies Kahn and Sherer (1990), Heneman and Werner (2005), show that a differenti-
ated wage system has little or no significant effect on firms’ performance. For example, Braakman
(2008) looked at the productivity of the firm by estimating sales divided by the number of workers
across German companies. He concludes that there is no significant effect due to introduction of a
differentiated payment scheme.
In addition, despite the variety of studies on impacts of pay-for-performance on the firm and the
individual levels, there is only a little research that examines the impacts of differentiated wages
on the health care system in particular. Liu and Mills (2005) explore the effects of a performance
related payment system on hospital revenue and productivity in China and analyzed whether pay-
4ments were associated with the provision of unnecessary care. They find little evidence that the
performance related pay impacts on the productivity of the hospitals and no evidence on the pro-
vision of unnecessary care.
A lot of work has been done on differentiated wage system. The results of these studies are
inconclusive. Some suggest that a differentiated wage system has a positive and significant impact
on productivity of the firms. On other hand, other studies show that there is no significant effect of
the differentiated wage system on firm’s performance. In this paper, I argue that the introduction of
a differentiated wage scheme negatively affects the performance of polyclinics of Kazakhstan. In
my analysis of the effect of differentiated wage system on polyclinics performance I will include
characteristics of polyclinics as well as the workers’ job performance. This paper contributes to the
existing literature and is the first one that examines the impact of the DWS on polyclinics efficiency
scores.
3 Data
In Kazakhstan, the national health policy is developed by the Ministry of Health and Social De-
velopment of Kazakhstan, which carries out planning through the adoption of strategic develop-
ment plans. Provision of medical care and its financing mechanisms are the jurisdiction of the
regional executive authorities and their subordinate regional offices of public health. Administra-
tive functions of care management and the governance of inpatient and outpatient organizations
are performed by fourteen regional offices of public health, as well as Astana and Almaty.
Since 2010, the country implemented the Integrated Health Information System (IHIS) oper-
ated by the Republican Center for Health Development, with the aim of improving the availability
5of health services for the population as well as the efficiency of the health system. The IHIS is a
software system that performs the collection, storage and analysis of information, and the person-
alization of medical data on every citizen. This system identifies the doctor and the clinic where
patients are treated.
The data from each polyclinic have been routinely collected and submitted to the Republican
Center for Health Development who provided it for the study. Also, the study was conducted with
the agreement and support from the Republican Center for Health Development. I use data from
IHIS for 2014 for a total of 259 polyclinics. The study focused on the sixteen region (oblast)
polyclinics of Kazakhstan. The research design provides an estimate for efficiency scores by con-
trasting polyclinics with differentiated wages and non-differentiated wages. Out of 259 polyclinics,
115 implemented a differentiated payment scheme each one at different time. Out of this 115, 13
polyclinics are private, and 102 are public. In total, 348 doctors out of 1126 received a differenti-
ated payment , and 462 nurses out of 1514. The average monthly amount of differentiated salaries
amounted to 1 doctor - 53,7 thousand tenge, and per 1 nurse - 31.8 thousand tenge. Table 1 shows
the averages of key variables per polyclinics with and without a differentiated wage system. In
order to characterize polyclinics and assess the differences between those with a differentiated and
a non-differentiated wage system, I begin with presenting descriptive statistics. Table 1 shows that
on average polyclinics with a differentiated wage system have more physicians and nurses than
polyclinics without the system. Furthermore, the number of visitors is higher in polyclinics with a
differentiated wage than a non-differentiated wage. Generally, in all of these key indicators, except
for the number of disabled people, the averages of polyclinics with the system are more than other
polyclinics. However, these differences are not statistically significant. The descriptive statistics
suggest that polyclinics with and without the system are the same almost in all their characteristics.
6A number of studies (e.g. Simar and Wilson, 2007, Bernet et al., 2008) have reported an appli-
cation in the health care area using the DEA bootstrapping method. Inputs in the DEA method are
the number of physicians and the number of nurses. DEA outputs are the number of polyclinic vis-
its and the number of home visits. According to Farrell’s definition the technical efficiency can be
seen from input as well as from output perspective. In this study the output orientation is assumed,
which means that “measures keep input constant and explore the proportional expansion in out-
put quantities that are possible” (Jacobs, Smith, and Street, 2006). There is an assumption that the
polyclinics have no control over inputs; however, it is possible to generate different level of outputs
by given inputs. There is no exact way to determine which variables to include in the DEA model
(Jacobs et al, 2006); however, in this study the choice of variables was intentional. The main re-
source categories available for primary polyclinics are human resources (medical staff), capital (an
equipment, a building, etc.), and pharmaceuticals. Among these possible input variables, capital
and pharmaceuticals could not be included, because of data limitations; and these two categories
are not common among the polyclinics included in the study. The capital (for example, equipment)
as a resource item differs from one polyclinics to another. The pharmaceuticals as a resource are
too complex variable for inclusion in the DEA model, which means, that organizations under the
study are homogeneous. Considering this fact, pharmaceuticals were not included in the study.
The same principle with outputs - variables should be common for all polyclinics to make it possi-
ble to compare them to each other and create relative efficiency scores (Jacobs et al, 2006). Also,
it is believed that selected outputs directly influenced by selected inputs (Jacobs et al, 2006), and
they captured both preventive and curative services of the polyclinics. The descriptive statistics of
the variables are shown in (Table 1).
74 Methodology
In order to determine the effects of the DWS and other environmental factors on polyclinics perfor-
mance Tobit regression is used. In this regression model the dependent variable is efficiency scores
which are calculated by using DEA bootstrapping method. I choose the Tobit model because the
dependent variable efficiency score is censored from below 0 and above 1. The independent vari-
ables are differentiated wage, location, people with disabilities, health budget, and capacity. The
differentiated wage is the dummy variable and results of the regression analysis show significance
of differentiated wage system on polyclinics efficiency. In this study I test the hypothesis if the
polyclinics with the DWS are more efficient rather than polyclinics without the DWS. In order to
answer this question I will use the following Tobit model:
Yi =

Y ∗i , if Y
∗
i > 0
0, if Y ∗i ≤ 0
(1)
Y ∗i = α0 + βDWSi + γXi + i (2)
where:
Y ∗i is the efficiency scores for polyclinic i, and is estimated by data envelopment analysis; DWSi
is the treatment dummy variable which indicates 1 if the polyclinic implemented the differentiated
wage system or 0 otherwise; Xi is the vector of variables which contain location, capacity, health
budget, type, and people with disabilities.
This study tests for differentiated wages versus non-differentiated wage system differences in
the efficiency scores of polyclinics in Kazakhstan. The null hypothesis is that there are no differ-
8ences in efficiencies between polyclinics with differentiated wage system and polyclinics without
differentiated wage system in Kazakhstan. Alternatively, given that there is a lot of spending on
differentiated wage system, it is more likely that polyclinics with the system may have higher
efficiencies relative to those without the system. Such findings would be consistent with the gov-
ernment’s anticipation.
Also, I am interested in finding which environmental and organizational variables may affect
the efficiency scores of polyclinics. Before showing the regression results, I introduce the hypothe-
ses concerning how each independent variable may affect the efficiency scores. One difference in
efficiency may be because of the location of the polyclinic. I hypothesize that the urban regions of
Kazakhstan tends to be more technologically advanced and have more professional staff and the
rural areas have problems in medical technology and lack of professional staff. Another hypothe-
sis is that private polyclinics are better than public polyclinics because private sector have to make
advances in health management in order to make profits. Private polyclinics were included only
if they provided free basic package of services budgeted by government. Also, I have to include
variable identifying population characteristic such as number of people with disabilities. I focus on
this characteristic because persons with disabilities might require more home visits. I hypothesize
that polyclinics which have more health budget tend to be more efficient. If physicians and nurses
get good wages they will provide better health care.
In this study the dependent variable the efficiency scores of polyclinics were measured by using
the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) bootstrapping method with 1000 iterations. DEA is an
axiomatic, mathematical programming approach to estimate efficiency scores of firms, hospitals,
banks, and other decision making units. DEA originates from the work by Farrell (1957), but
current popularity is due to paper by (Charnes et al, 1978). It is a non-parametric method used
9to estimate the frontier function (Kuosmanen, 2006).The DEA technique is popular because of its
flexibility and ease of application: it allows to use datum which are often routinely collected in the
firm, it is possible to use multiple inputs and multiple outputs at the same time, does not require any
assumption of functional form, therefore any inputs and outputs can be used for analysis (Jacobs,
Smith, and Street, 2006).
There is a mathematical formulation of DEA method. In order to obtain efficiency scores of
polyclinics the objective function is maximized. The objective function is:
θ =
u1y10 + u2y20 + ...+ uryr0
v1x10 + v2x20 + ...+ vmxm0
=
s∑
r=1
uryr0
m∑
i=1
vixi0
(3)
Subject to
Pol1 :
u1y11 + u2y21 + ...+ uryr1
v1x11 + v2x21 + ...+ vmxm1
=
s∑
r=1
uryr1
m∑
i=1
vixi1
≤ 1 (4)
Polj :
u1y1j + u2y2j + ...+ uryrj
v1x1j + v2x2j + ...+ vmxmj
=
s∑
r=1
uryrj
m∑
i=1
vixij
≤ 1 (5)
where:
Polj - polyclinic number j; θ - efficiency score of the polyclinic being evaluated by DEA; yrj -
amount of output r used by polyclinic j; xij - amount of input i used by polyclinic j; i - number
of inputs used by the Pols; r - number of outputs generated by the Pols; ur - coefficient or weight
assigned by DEA to output r; vi - coefficient or weight assigned by DEA to input i.
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5 Results and discussion
The results of the implementation of the DWS (Table 2) show that the system has negative and
significant effects on efficiency scores. It means that polyclinics without the differentiated wage
system are more efficient than polyclinics with the system by 6.4 percentage points on average.
Physicians and nurses in polyclinics with differentiated wage system visited less patients com-
pared to visits of physicians and nurses in polyclinics without the system. Also, patients visited
more polyclinics without the system. This result is counterintuitive as it was anticipated that the
introduction of such a system would motivate health workers and therefore increase the produc-
tivity of the polyclinics. However, the efficiency scores for polyclinics with the DWS are lower
than polyclinics without the DWS. The possible reason of this negative result is that although the
amount of spending has increased, the total amount of work has also increased. The physicians and
nurses complain that paper documents have been increased after implementing the new system.
The results of the Tobit regression analysis (Table 2) suggest that location has a positive sig-
nificant effect on the efficiency scores of polyclinics, which implies that polyclinics in urban areas
are more efficient than polyclinics from rural areas. Physicians and nurses in urban regions visited
more patients compare to visits of medical staff in rural regions by 9.1 percentage points on aver-
age. Also, patients visited more polyclinics in urban areas. This result is consistent as it could be
explained by the fact that the health care system is more technologically advanced in urban areas.
In addition, the type of polyclinics has positive significant effects on efficiency scores. Physicians
and nurses in private polyclinics visited more patients compare to visits of medical staff in public
polyclinics by 5.2 percentage points. Also, patients visited more private polyclinics. Private poly-
clinics tend to be more efficient than public polyclinics. These results can be explained intuitively
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by taking into account that the private sector will have advances in health management in order to
make more profits. Also, private polyclinics might have access to better equipment and capital.
In Figure 1 the distribution of efficiency scores is shown for polyclinics with the DWS in
comparison with polyclinics without this system. The scores are normally distributed and there
are some differences between these polyclinics. There are more polyclinics with the system which
scores are around 0.6 and 0.75 than polyclinics without the system. However, the figure also
shows that there are polyclinics without the system in which scores are around 0.8 and 0.95 than
in polyclinics with the system. The number of service units, where efficiency scores are equal to
1.0 are approximately the same in both types of polyclinics.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of public and private polyclinics. The distribution of the ef-
ficiency scores of public and private are normally distributed. There are more public polyclinics
where scores are around 0.2 and 0.3 than in private polyclinics. Most of the efficiency scores of
private polyclinics are between 0.5 and 0.75. There are more private polyclinics where efficiency
scores equal to 1 than in public polyclinics.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of urban and rural polyclinics. The distribution of efficiency
scores of polyclinics in urban area is left skewed towards higher efficiency scores. There are more
urban polyclinics where scores are around 0.65 and 0.90 than in rural polyclinics. Most of the
efficiency scores of urban polyclinics are between 0.5 and 0.9.
There are several implications that can be drawn from this study. First, while incentivizing
health care providers by supplementary payments, the implementation of the program caused ad-
ditional work such as, increased paper documents, or work for the fulfillment of plans set by the
Ministry. These factors could explain the negative impact of the DWS, as workers spend a vast
time on the job that is not directly related to the improvement of public health. Second, in order
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to further improve the DWS and provide material incentives for health care providers there is a
need to strengthen their salaries depending on the size and the degree of difficulty and intensity
of work, quality of care, as well as creating incentives for continuous professional development
and training of medical professionals. Finally, optimally designed remuneration system is not only
a way to monitor staff performance, but also an incentive to the development of the organization.
However, due to the lack of appropriate cost-benefit analysis, an inaccurately planned design of the
program can have negative effects on the whole labor remuneration system. The implementation
of the program has cost 3 million US dollars for the Government of Kazakhstan. Given the result
of this study and huge spending, the Government needs to carefully plan and design its programs
in the future.
6 Robustness analysis on self-selection
It is possible that the selection procedure of the polyclinics that implemented the differentiated
wage system was not random. Therefore, it is possible that there is an endogeneity problem of in-
troducing a differentiated wage system. Also, there is no information about when each polyclinic
implemented a new system. It could be possible that polyclinics introduced the system at differ-
ent times during 2011-2014 years. This also could create endogeneity problem. In order to solve
these problems I use propensity score matching. By using this method I attempt to estimate the
effect of the differentiated wage system by accounting for the covariates. Also, propensity score
is used in order to reduce selection bias by equating group based on the control variables such as
capacity, number of disabled, and health budget. I restricted the sample by using the propensity
score matching method that in effects removes polyclinics that were unlikely to be treated. The
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results of the propensity score matching (Table 3) is consistent with the results of the Tobit re-
gression. The differentiated wage system has a negative effect on efficiency scores of polyclinics
and it is statistically significant. It means that polyclinics without a differentiated wage system
are better compared to polyclinics with a differentiated wage system by seven percentage points
on average. Also, I used different methods of matching such as nearest-neighbor matching and
inverse-probability weighting in order to check for consistency. Results suggest that polyclinics
without a differentiated wage system are better compared to polyclinics with a differentiated wage
system by between five and seven percent on average and significant at five to ten percentage
points.
It is possible to check for overlapping assumption. The figure 7 shows the estimated density
of the predicted probabilities of polyclinics without the system and predicted probabilities of poly-
clinics with the system. We can see that neither plot displays too much probability mass near 0 or
1. Also, the two estimated densities have majority of their corresponding masses in area in which
they overlap each other. Therefore, we can say that the overlap assumption is not violated.
In order to check for robustness I also used quantile regression. It is possible that there are
outliers in the dataset. These outliers could impact the regression estimates therefore I interested in
distributional robustness. The results of the quantile regression is consistent with Tobit regression.
The differentiated wage system has a negative effect on efficiency scores of polyclinics and it is
statistically significant. This implies that polyclinics without the DWS are better compared to
polyclinics with the DWS by nine percentage points on average.
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7 Future research
In this study I use cross sectional data in order to determine the effects of the differentiated wage
system on polyclinic performance. As it was mentioned before, non-random selection and the im-
plementation of the system at different point of times create an endogeneity problem. In order to
solve this problem, I use the propensity score matching and quantile regression analysis. However,
there are still several limitations of this study that need to be addressed in future research. First,
this study lacks the information on quality of service and the time-intensity of different treatments.
To overcome this problem, it could be possible to collect data on justified complaints, index of
untimely diagnosed pulmonary tuberculosis, level of hospitalizing the patients from among popu-
lation attached due to complications of cardiovascular diseases, infant mortality rate from 7 days
to 5 years, or the ratio of the number of unnecessary hospitalizations to the total number of hospi-
talizations. These indicators could help better evaluate polyclinic performance in general. Because
the DEA bootstrapping method could handle multiple inputs and multiple outputs, we could add
these indicators in order to have polyclinic efficiency scores based on quality. The resulting esti-
mates could lead to more consistent outcomes.
Second, it is possible to include the difference in difference approach to overcome an unob-
served heterogeneity problem. The model would include two sets of groups at different periods of
time. The counterfactual would be polyclinics, for example in 2010, that are not exposed to the
treatment during both periods. In the case of polyclinics where the same units within a group are
observed in each time period (for example, 2010 and 2014), the average gain in the polyclinics
performance in 2010 (control) group can be subtracted from the average gain in the polyclinics
performance in 2014 (treatment) group. This set up will help to solve an unobserved heterogeneity
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and find the true effect of the differentiated wage system on polyclinic performance.
Finally, we could find out the exact time when each polyclinic introduced the differentiated
wage system. Using quality oriented inputs and outputs we could re-calculate efficiency scores.
Hence, it is possible to construct panel data and to use the difference in difference method in order
to obtain the effect of the differentiated wage on polyclinic performance. As a result of expanded
data set, the introduction of exact timing of implementation of the system and alteration in method-
ological approach could ultimately result in better estimates with different set of outcomes.
8 Conclusion
The implementation of a differentiated wage system is an ongoing process. The government of
Kazakhstan has concluded that “Salamatty Kazakhstan 2011-2014” program caused an improve-
ment of quality in healthcare system. I analyze 259 polyclinics performance as a result of intro-
duction of differentiated wage system. The results of Tobit regression analysis show that type and
location of polyclinics has significant effect on efficiency scores. The main result of this study is
that the new system negatively affects polyclinics performance. Therefore, we might say that in
general polyclinics with differential system are not better than other polyclinics. In my view, the
further research is needed in order to determine the true effect of the differentiated wage system
on polyclinic performance.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for key indicators of polyclinics
Variable Differentiated wage Non-differentiated wage Difference
Mean SE Mean SE t-value
Inputs
Physicians 7.58 1.85 6.91 1.48 0.2866
Nurses 6.06 1.48 5.53 1.18 0.2746
Outputs
Polyclinic visits 36645.82 1542.5 35379.78 1276.6 0.6383
Home visits 2534.42 85.01 2368.01 69.2 1.5343
Environmental and
organizational
variables
Health budget 13683.91 1601.74 11468.71 1289.56 1.0899
Disabled people 75.38 5.72 88.34 5.87 1.5551
Capacity 132.47 2.34 129.61 1.96 0.9356
Efficiency score 0.6325 0.016 0.6577 0.016 0.2764
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Table 2: Tobit regression results
Dependent variable: Efficiency score
model
Differentiated wage system -0.064∗∗
(0.030)
Location 0.091∗∗∗
(0.031)
Health budget 0.000
(0.000)
Capacity 0.001
(0.001)
Type 0.052∗
(0.030)
Number of disabled 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.487∗∗∗
(0.077)
sigma
Constant 0.195∗∗∗
(0.009)
N 259
R2 0.1146
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Matching estimators
Efficiency score Matches Propensity score Nearest- neighbor IPW
ATE diff
(1 vs 0)
1
-0.075**
(0.035)
0.061
(0.039)
-0.055
(0.037)
5
-0.045
(0.033)
-0.055*
(0.030)
10
-0.051*
(0.032)
-0.047*
(0.027)
Standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 4: Quantile regression results
Dependent variable: Efficiency score
Differentiated wage system -0.092∗∗
(0.041)
Location 0.114∗∗∗
(0.042)
Health budget 0.000
(0.000)
Capacity 0.001
(0.001)
Type 0.087∗∗
(0.041)
Disabled people 0.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.403∗∗∗
(0.104)
N 259
R2 0.203
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Density in efficiency scores between polyclinics with and without differentiated wages.
23
Figure 2: Density in efficiency scores between public and private polyclinics.
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Figure 3: Density in efficiency scores between polyclinics in rural and urban areas.
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Figure 4: Density in capacities between polyclinics with without differentiated wages.
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Figure 5: Density in health budget between polyclinics with and without differentiated wages.
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Figure 6: Density in number of disabled people between polyclinics with and without differentiated
wages.
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Figure 7: Propensity score. Overlap plot.
